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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article demonstrates how the interaction of a federal statute
passed in 1864,' a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1978,2 and modem
technology has legally debarred every state legislature from controlling
consumer interest rates in its state-but not from passing laws that appear to
do so-and has politically debarred the Congress from setting federal rates
to replace the state rates. As a consequence, the elaborate usury laws on the
books of most states are only a trompe l'oeil, a "visual
deception... rendered in extremely fine detail ... ." The presence of these
finely detailed laws gives the illusion that local legislatures are guarding
their constituents from high rates, but they are not.
Typically, these usury laws deal separately with each particular
fragment of the consumer credit market. For example, Minnesota allows a
rate of 18% for credit card loans; closed-end loans can be made with rates as
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I
especially thank Jeffrey Kayes '00 for his assiduous research assistance. I also want to thank
Nancy Vettorello, research librarian, Paul Astolfi '00, Janis Proctor, and Professor Lewis Burke
of the University of South Carolina for their assistance.
1. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). The National Bank Act is commonly referred to as the
"National Bank Act of 1863," although it was enacted in 1864.
2. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
3. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1518 (1973)
445
HeinOnline  -- 51 S. C. L. Rev. 445 1999-2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
high as 33%,4 but economically equivalent credit sales are limited to 8%.'
South Carolina permits a rate of 15% per month for deferred presentment
and allows an unlimited interest rate for open-end loans in certain
situations.7 These usury laws are the product of decades of lobbying by
members of particular industries; they follow no understandable pattern and
are not logically or economically coherent. To give a taste of these state
laws, this Article compares the statutory rules in Minnesota with those in
South Carolina. In general, South Carolina is generous to creditors whereas
Minnesota is strict. Low ceilings prevail in Minnesota; in South Carolina the
ceiling is high, often unlimited!
Minnesota and South Carolina are good foils. In appearance,
Minnesota's laws are much more restrictive. The Chart below shows that
the nominally permissible rates on identical loans are higher in South
Carolina when each state explicitly authorizes the same type of loan.
INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS IN MINNESOTA AND SOUTH CAROLINA
$300 0 1.000
4.st EhENhE IEJ.AN.§ 7.93)a)(es Sp. 00)
5. Id. § 334.01(l) (West 1993). Minnesota excludes credit sale contracts from the
definition of "loans." Id. § 47.59(l) (West Supp. 2000). Therefore, the interest rates for credit
sale contracts are not governed by the limits allowed in section 47.59(3)(a) and are instead
governed by the general usury limit of 8%. Id. § 334.01(l) (1993); see also id. § 334.16(l)(a)
(excluding closed-end loans from section 334.01).
6. S.C CODE ANN. § 34-39-180(E) (West Supp. 1999).
7. Id. § 37-3-201(l) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & West Supp. 2000)
8. Why Minnesota usury law is more restrictive than South Carolina law is beyond
the scope of this paper and beyond my capacity to answer. Perhaps it is no more than a by-
product of left-wing politics in Minnesota. Perhaps it is recognition of the traditional political
power of debtors in Minnesota (farmers) compared with the more limited political powver of the
South Carolina debtor class (African-Americans). I cannot explain why the southern populism
that has surely affected the law of some southern states, e.g., Arkansas, has not had a larger
impact in South Carolina.
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The Appendix to this Article provides a full discussion of the data presented
above.
Beyond low rate ceilings, the courts of Minnesota have been
receptive to debtors' usury arguments.9 To the embarrassment of Minnesota,
the revolutionary case that brought about the current regime, Marquette
National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,'° was a Minnesota case and
was stimulated by the restrictive Minnesota rates. A more recent case from
South Carolina has extended the rule.!1
But this article is not about Minnesota or South Carolina's statutory
rules or case law. I use those states only to show whence we have come and
how grand the trompe l'oeiL This Article explains how the power to set rates
has been taken from the hands of state legislators without their ever
appreciating it. I argue that the stem statutory restrictions on rates in
Minnesota are an illusion whose only current function is to give the
appearance that the state is protecting consumers from high rates.
When Congress adopted section 85 of the National Bank Act of
1863 to permit national banks to charge any rate that was permitted where
they were "located," it could hardly have foreseen that consumers in the
twentieth century would borrow from a distant bank by the use of a plastic
card. That this statute would allow a bank in New York to lend from its
South Dakota subsidiary to a resident of New York under South Dakota law,
and so escape the New York usury law, would have seemed preposterous to
a Civil War congressman. On the other hand, section 85 was a self-
conscious use of federal power to protect national banks from discrimination
by states. The law under section 85 has plodded along to its present location
by one logical, irresistible step after another and without further help from
Congress.'2 This progress has been hidden from the public and state
9. Over the last ten years in South Carolina, only one case has dealt with usury. See
Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 333 S.C. 33, 508 S.E.2d 16 (1998). Tilley was a class action against
the seller by buyers of aluminum windows, awnings, and doors. The South Carolina law
regarding security interests in real estate requires the lender to ascertain preference of the
borrower as to legal counsel. Summaryjudgmentwas granted for the buyers; the seller appealed,
arguing that the statute of limitations had run. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
at 42-43, 508 S.E.2d at 20-21.
In Minnesota a series of cases went to the Minnesota appellate courts. In Miller v.
Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1994), the district court had held that rental purchase
agreements were within the definition of consumer credit sales. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that these transactions were outside of the definition of consumer credit sales and thus
not limited to 8% interest. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreedwith the district court and found
that the transactions were sales subject to the 8% rule, not leases. Id. at 548.
In Anderson v. Scandinavian US. Swim & Fitness, Inc., No. C8-98-783, 1998 WL
747297, at*6 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 27,1998), a membership contractto ScandinavianU.S. Swim
& Fitness (d/b/a Bally Total Fitness) was usuriousbecauseit exceeded the applicable 8% interest
limit.
10. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
11. Cades v. H & R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 873-74 (4th Cir. 1994).
12. See Tiffany v. National Bank ofMissouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873). Tiffany
was the first Supreme Court interpretation of section 85. The Court allowed a national bank
located in Missouri to use a nonbank rate of 10%, even though a Missouri-chartered state bank
could not use that rate. The Court characterized the National Bank Act as "an enabling statute,
not a restraining one ... ."Id. at 411. "It cannot be doubted, in view of the purpose of Congress
2000
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legislators by the camouflage of usury laws on the books of almost all states
that appear to cover loans to that state's debtors. Day by day these local laws
have become a more exaggerated illusion; under the Marquette doctrine, the
sternest state laws are the first to be undermined and the quickest to fall.
In the Sections that follow I will examine different aspects of usury
law that have led it to its current state. Part II discusses the various types of
consumer transactions affected by usury laws. Part I analyzes the state and
federal competition in banking that produced section 85 and the Marquette
case. Part IV examines the effects of section 85 and Marquette on other
federal and state law. Part V looks at the Marquette doctrine's extension
beyond credit cards. Part VI reviews the doctrine's potential application to
the last bastion of local control over usury law-pawns, rent-to-own, and
loans by merchants that are not banks. Finally, Part VII considers the
wisdom of the current regime compared to other plausible regimes.
II. CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS AFFECTED BY THE USURY LAWS
To understand the usury laws and the issues associated with the
intrusion of the Marquette case into those laws, one must know something
about the consumer-credit market. Consider secured loans. Most secured
loans are purchase money loans made to finance the purchase of an item
(e.g., a house or a car) that becomes the collateral. Most of these loans are
"closed-end" loans-a loan to be paid down in installments that is secured
by a particular piece of collateral. Some transactions are treated as purchase
money loans in some states and as leases in others,'3 but these are rent-to-
own transactions. In a rent-to-own contract, the lessee (buyer) is free to
return the item rented at the end of any rental period; he gets title to the item
by completing all of the contemplated payments. 14 Because there is no
obligation to keep paying, most states treat this as a lease'5 not subject to the
usury law on loans, but some states differ.'6
in providing for the organization of National banking associations, that it was intended to give
them a firm footing in the different States where they might be located. It was expected they
would come into competition with State banks, and it was intended to give them at least equal
advantages in such competition." Id. at 412.
13. See infra notes 15 & 16.
14. See James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J 751,755-56 (1991).
15. See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.622(d) (West 1998) (defining a rental purchase
agreement as a true lease); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 5-10-201(1) &-202(1)(h) (1999) (stating rental
purchase agreement statute does not apply to security interests); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481M-
3(a) (Michie 1998) (excluding lease-purchase agreements from statutes on consumer credit sales
and UCC Articles 2A and 9); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-19-105(a) (Lexis 1999) (excluding rental
purchase agreements from laws of security interests and Wyoming Uniform Consumer Credit
Code); see also In re Rigg, 198 B.R. 681,685 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (finding rental purchase
agreement in Texas is a true lease that must be assumed or rejected in bankruptcy); In re
Bowman, 194 B.R. 227,228 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995) (finding rent-to-own transactions are leases
under Arizona law).
16. See Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544,547 (Minn. 1994) (treating rent-
to-own contract as a sale); see also In re Barnhill, 189 B.R. 611, 615 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1992)
(finding rental purchase agreements are security agreements and not leases in South Carolina);
Vol. 51:445
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Other secured loans are nonpurchase money, mostly made to
debtors at the lower end of the economic spectrum. 7 For example, a small
loan company might take a security interest in a consumer's household
goods, or a pawnbroker might lend against the jewelry that a consumer owns
and offers as collateral. 8
Many consumer loans are unsecured. Chief among these are credit
card loans, the typical open-ended loan in which the consumer gets a line of
credit that contemplates an infinite series of separate loans and payments.
For high-income consumers, there might also be closed-end unsecured
loans, and for low-income consumers, there are "payday" loans. Payday
loans (and a variation, check-cashing services) are short-term loans against a
potential paycheck or against a check of a third party made payable to the
borrower. 9 The typical payday loan is unsecured because the loan is made
with nothing more than the debtor's assurance that he will bring in his
paycheck or that the personal check drawn by the borrower and left with the
lender will be good some days hence. Check "cashing," on the other hand, is
secured (if it is a loan at all), for the debtor gives the lender a check drawn
by a third party.2'
Consumer creditors choose to make loans in different ways for
various reasons. Some modes of lending respond to the real value of the
collateral (cars and homes). Others respond to the debtor's wish to have an
option to return goods and end the transaction (rent-to-own).2' And some of
the variation in loan type within and between states is doubtless caused by
the usury laws themselves. If a creditor can make a credit card loan at 18%,
but gets only 8% on a closed-end loan, that creditor who would otherwise
deal on a closed-end basis is likely to try to recast its loans so that they fit
the credit card mold.' However, the notion that states can effectively
Green v. Continental Rentals, 678 A.2d 759, 766 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (classifying
rent-to-own contracts as security agreements).
17. See, e.g., Jean Ann Fox, WhatDoes it Take to be a Loan Shark in 1998?7A Report
on the Payday Loan Industry, 772 PRAc. L. INsT./CoM. 987 (1998) (discussing payday loans);
Joseph B. Cahill, License to Owe: Title-Loan Firms Offer Car Owners a Solution That Often
Backfires, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1999, at Al (discussing title loans); Jonathan Weil, Ace Cash
Express MayBe on Verge of Unchecked Growth, Say Bulls, WAL. ST. J. (Texas), Aug. 13, 1997,
at T2 (quoting Professor John Caskey on the effects of the pawn brokers on the poor).
18. See generally S.C. CODEANN. § 40-39-10(2) & (7) (West Supp. 1999) (defining
"pawnbroker" and "pawn transaction"); Willis J. Wheat, A Study on the Status of the
Pawnbrokers Industry in the State of Oklahoma, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 87 (1998)
(analyzing the pawnbroking market and its profitability in Oklahoma).
19. SeeJonathan Weil,Ace Cash 'sPayday-Loan Venture CouldBe CatalystforStock
Growth, WALL ST. J. (Texas), Sept. 29, 1999, at T2.
20. See Jeff D. Opdyke, 7-Eleven Tests Check-Cashing in Texas Stores, WALL ST. J.
(Texas), Apr. 29, 1998, at T1.
21. Nehf, supra note 14, at 756.
22. Numerous cases show that sellers may have been motivated by such concerns.
See e.g., Benion v. Bank One, Dayton, N.A., 144 F.3d 1056, 1060 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 406 (1998) (finding credit card issued for satellite dish installation with credit limit only
a few hundred dollars above the cost of the installation was an open-end loan for Truth in
Lending Act purposes); Perry v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 423,437 (M.D. Ala.
1998) (certifying a class of plaintiffs under the Truth in Lending Act after they financed satellite
dish purchases).
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regulate the interest rates creditors offer to consumers is outdated. The
Marquette case began the process of eroding state power over interest
rates-a power that now stands at the vanishing point.
III. MARQUETTE NATIONAL BANK
From the beginning of the nineteenth century until late in the
twentieth century, the states and the federal government fought for the
power to charter and control commercial banks. This dispute dates back to at
least 1816 when Congress enacted legislation that formed the Bank of the
United States' and 1819 when the Supreme Court ruled that Maryland's
attempt to quash it was unconstitutional.' The high point of state power
must have come in 1832 when President Jackson vetoed the extension of the
charter for the Bank of the United States.' Later, the economic demands and
difficulties of the Civil War caused Congress to enact the National Bank Act
of 1863.26 Even after that Act, state banks maintained their superior position
by popularizing checking accounts27 and by giving real estate loans and time
deposits.' Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and beyond
the middle of the twentieth, the states and the federal government competed
for charters, mostly by promising powers (such as greater branching rights,
or the power to make particular loans) in their jurisdiction that were not
available in the other. In response to those inducements, banks sometimes
switched from state to national charters and, in a few cases, even switched
back.'
In 1913 the federal government attempted to reduce the advantage
of state banks by passing the Federal Reserve Act, which established the
Federal Reserve Bank and its twelve district banks." Although some banks
that were state-chartered converted to national charters, most did not.3' "In
1919 the national banks' share of total commercial bank assets fell below 50
percent" and continued to fall in the years that followed. 32 To return state
and national banks to positions of "competitive equality," '33 Congress
23. See generally John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-Emption of State
Banking Law, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 221 (1999) (discussing the federal government's role
in bank regulation).
24. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,435 (1819).
25. See President Andrew Jackson's Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 3
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, at 1139-54 (James D. Richardson ed. 1897).
26. See Duncan, supra note 23, at 221.
27. See id. at 221-22.
28. SeeBENJAMINJ.KLEBANER, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING: AHISTORY 135
(1990).
29. See Duncan, supra note 23, at 221-22.
30. See W.P.G.HARDING, THEFORMATIVEPERIOD OFTHEFEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
34-35 (1925); JAMES LIVINGSTON, ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: MONEY, CLASS,
AND CORPORATECAPrrALiSM, 1890-1913, 219-24 (1986).
31. See KLEBAN R, supra note 28, at 135.
32. Id.
33. See First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966)
(discussing the legislative history of the McFadden Act of 1927).
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adopted the McFadden Act.3 4 That Act increased the powers of national
banks to underwrite securities, make real estate loans, lend larger amounts to
a single borrower, and open new branches." However, state banks still
maintained advantages over national banks, and their share of the banking
industry continued to expand.
Faced with the Great Depression and cascading bank failures,
Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933
to protect customers of failed banks.3' Though a majority of banks were still
state-chartered, over 90% of all banks became FDIC insured.7 This federal
protection introduced state banks to federal supervision and, ultimately, to
covert Congressional control through legislation that could regulate the
behavior of all banks that had chosen to join the FDIC.
Of course, banking and commercial practice also progressed.
Starting first as an extension of the traditional seller's "charge account,"
credit cards were issued by merchants to their customers.38 Then came "third
party" cards issued by financial institutions.39 In 1966 Bank of America
created the first nationwide credit card, BankAmericard (later renamed
Visa).' Though it was not apparent at the time, Bank of America had set the
stage for the next battle between the federal and state banking systems.
Visa's network of merchants that agreed to honor any Visa card,
wherever issued, enabled Omaha National, headquartered in Nebraska, to
make consumer loans to Minnesota residents by issuing cards to them. In the
case of Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,4  a bank
located in Minneapolis sought to enjoin First of Omaha Service Corporation
and Omaha- National Bank, a Nebraska-chartered national bank, from
making credit card loans to residents of Minnesota at interest rates that
exceeded Minnesota's usury rates.42 Nebraska law permitted interest rates to
be charged at a rate of 18% for the first $999.99, and 12% for any amount
owed of $1000 or more.43 The Minnesota rate was a flat 12%.' Both
Marquette Bank and Omaha National were enrolled in the BankAmericard
program that allowed purchases of goods and services at participating
merchants wherever the merchants were located.4
The Minnesota trial court enjoined First of Omaha from using
34. The McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 36(s) (1994)).
35. See 44 Stat. at 1228; KLEBANER, supra note 28, at 135.
36. See id. at 142-43.
37. Id. at 142.
38. See TERRY GALANOY, CHARGE IT: INSIDE THE CREDIT CARD CONsPIRACY 20-21(1980).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. 262 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. 1977).
42. Id. at360-61.
43. Id. at 359.
44. Id.
45. After the case was removed to federal court for diversity reasons, Omaha Bank
was dropped as a defendant, and it was remanded to the Minnesota district court; however, the
case was treated as if Omaha Bank was still a defendant See id.
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Nebraska rates in Minnesota, and First of Omaha appealed.46 Relying on
Fisher v. First National Bank,47 and rejecting a contrary district court case
from Louisiana," the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.49
Marquette Bank appealed to the United States Supreme Court,0
which affirmed:
Section 85 . . . plainly provides that a
national bank may charge interest "on any
loan" at the rate allowed by the laws of
the State in which the bank is "located."
The question before us is therefore
narrowed to whether Omaha Bank and its
BankAmericard program are "located" in
Nebraska and for that reason entitled to
charge its Minnesota customers the rate of
interest authorized by Nebraska law.'
First, the Court noted that Congress apparently intended section 85
to give national banks an advantage over state banks.52 Second, to determine
where Omaha was located for purposes of this section, the Court looked to
the history of the National Bank Act of 1863. Congress seemed to assume
that a national bank was located in the state identified on its organization
certificate.5 3 The Court held that "Omaha Bank cannot be deprived of this
location merely because it is extending credit to residents of a foreign
State." s4 Omaha National's location could not change simply because its
customers were conducting transactions with Minnesota merchants."5
Finally, responding to Marquette Bank's arguments, the Court found that
Congress knew what it was doing when it established the National Bank Act
and that this was an intended result.56
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected Marquette Bank's argument
that Omaha National's marketing of its card to Minnesota residents should
subject it to Minnesota usury laws. The Court stated, "Minnesota residents
46. Id. at 362.
47. 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding an Illinois-headquartered national bank
can charge Illinois rates to Iowa residents).
48. See Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Recile, 302 F. Supp. 62,75 (E.D. La. 1969)
(holding "12 U.S.C. § 85 fixes the rate of interest chargeable by a national bank only as to loans
made in the state where the bank is located; it does not fix the rate of interest which may be
charged by a national bank which is located in one state and makes a loan in another state").
49. 262 N.W.2d at 365.
50. See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 436 U.S. 916 (1978).
51. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978)
(footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 314-15.
53. Id. at310.
54. Id.
55. Id. at312.
56. See id. at 314-15 (finding Congress was aware in 1864 ofthepotential inequities
of an interstate banking system).
Vol. 51: 445
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were always free to visit Nebraska and receive loans in that State. It has not
been suggested that Minnesota usury laws would apply to such
transactions."' The Court further stated that the convenience of modem
technology did not change the intentions of the drafters of the National Bank
Act of 1863-that a bank's location controlled the interest rates it could
charge." If the law of the place of purchase governed, Minnesota residents
that traveled to other states would be subject to different laws wherever they
went, which would be an intolerable result not only for the creditor but also
for the debtor.59 So twentieth century technology commanded but one
answer from nineteenth century law.
IV. EFFECr ON OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
With the Marquette decision every bank located in Minnesota was
at a competitive disadvantage compared to Omaha National. Omaha
National could lend to Minnesota residents at the Nebraska rate, but every
state and national bank located in Minnesota was limited to the lower
Minnesota rate. Worse yet, every state-chartered bank outside of Minnesota
was also at a disadvantage by comparison to Omaha National (and with
every other national bank located in a state with generous usury laws), for
none of the state banks chartered in foreign states enjoyed the benefit of
section 85.
To alleviate this disparity, two laws were required--one state and
one federal. Only the state of Minnesota could put Minnesota-chartered state
banks and Minnesota-located national banks on equal footing with out-of-
state competitors for loans to Minnesota residents. Only the federal
government could authorize state-chartered banks in Nebraska and other
states to carry their rates abroad like a national bank could. The upshot was
the modification of federal laws to give state banks essentially the same
rights that national banks have under section 85 and to change many states'
limits on credit card loans to allow in-state banks to compete with out-of-
state banks. This legislative effort was assisted by the fact that interest rates
peaked at abnormally high levels in 1979 and 1980 during the last year of
President Carter's terro. The intent of Congress was clearly enunciated
during the congressional hearings in which the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs recognized that the escalating interest
rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s, coupled with recent findings by the
Supreme Court, had the effect of strangling state banks.6' The legislative
57. Id. at310-11.
58. Id. at311.
59. See id. at 312 (noting that varying the definition of "located" by each transaction
would cause confusion in the interstate system).
60. See J. PIERRE V. BENOIT, UNITED STATESINTERE RATES AND THE INTERESTRATE
DILEMMA FORTHE DEVELOPING WORLD 7-8 (1986).
61. To Equalize Competition Between State and National Banks and for Other
Purposes: Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 96th Cong. 18-19 (1979) (statement of David Pryor, Senator, Arkansas) [hereinafter
Hearings].
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hearings regarding the relaxation of the regulation on state banks brought
forth testimony from those most keenly interested in state banking.
Frederick Schultz, Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, testified, "I
would also note that the sponsors of S. 1988 have emphasized the goal of
equalizing competition among national banks and other depository
institutions. The Board shares the view that, in principle, similarly situated
lenders should operate in similar regulatory environments. The bill would
achieve partial competitive equality .... 
62
The result was federal legislation passed in 1980 that freed state
lending institutions from onerous state usury limitations. The most pressing
evidence of Congress's intent to return state banks to the level of national
banks can now be found in 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a):
(a) Interest rates
In order to prevent discrimination against State-
chartered insured depository institutions, including
insured savings banks, or insured branches of foreign
banks with respect to interest rates... such State bank
or such insured branch of a foreign bank may [charge
interest on a loan] ... at the rate allowed by the laws
of the State, territory, or district where the bank is
located... 63
Section 1831d applies only to federally insured depository institutions. By
dealing only with FDIC-insured banks, Congress could grant powers to
state-chartered banks without appearing to infinge upon state prerogatives.
The states also did their part to allow their own banks to compete
with out-of-state institutions. For example, in 1982 Minnesota amended its
usury laws to allow in-state banks to make credit card loans at 18%; in that
same year, South Carolina amended its law to allow unlimited interest
rates.64 Many other states also amended their usury laws to allow their own
state banks to compete with out-of-state national and state-chartered banks.65
62. Hearings, supra note 61, at 36 (statement ofFrederick H. Schultz, Vice Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1994) (emphasis added); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1785(g)(1)
(1994) (stating that all credit unions are allowed to charge interest at the rate allowed by the laws
of the state, territory, or district in which they are located if they are federally insured).
64. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.59(3) (West Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-
201(2) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & West Supp. 1999).
65. See ARK. CONST. amend. 60 (amending, in 1982, article 19, section 13 from
allowing only 10% interest on open-ended loans to a floating interest rate set at 5% above the
Federal Reserve DiscountRate, capped at 17%); MASS. GEN. LAwsANN. ch. 140, § 114B (West
Supp. 1999) (changing allowable credit card interest rates from 18% for the amount of the
balance under $500 and 12% for the amount above $500 to a flat 18% APR in 1981); 1982 Pa.
Laws 199, No. 68, § 5 (changing Pennsylvania from allowing credit card interest limitations of
two-thirds of one percent per month (8% APR) to 18% APR with the codification of 69 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1501 (West Supp. 1999); 1982 S.C. Acts 385, § 30 (removing South
Carolina's interest rate restrictions for certain lenders and codifying removal at S.C. CODE ANN.
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V. MARQUEYTE TRiuMPHANT
To say that a bank can carry its credit card "rate" to another state is
important, but many questions remained after Marquette. What about the
home state's late fees? What of restrictions on the kinds of loans that can be
offered? If the small-loan rate at the bank's location applied to loans up to
$600 but only up to $300 in the debtor's state, which rate applies? And what
about closed-end loans, car loans and the like? How much contact can the
bank have with the debtor's state and still bring its own rates from abroad?
In the years since Marquette, the courts have answered many of these
questions.
A first step beyond Marquette was Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A." Smiley allowed a foreign national bank to import its South
Dakota late fees to California. Relying on the Comptroller's regulations,67
the Court found that the late charges were protected by section 85. It reached
this conclusion in the face of a claim not only that the charges were higher
than California could have charged, but also that they were
"unconscionable." In short section 85 was to be interpreted expansively, so
the debtor's state could not achieve its purpose by giving different labels to
its restrictions, nor could its courts protect local restrictions by somehow
defining foreign charges as something other than interest.
Next came the closed-end cases. These cases are different from
Marquette in several ways. Consider Cades v. H & R Block, Inc." Mr.
Cades engaged H & R Block to prepare his federal tax return. Entitled to a
refund, Cades arranged with H & R Block to get a loan for the entire refund,
less a finance charge. All he had to do was assign the right to his refund
payment to a lending institution, Beneficial National Bank, in Delaware.
Cades filled out the loan documents in South Carolina on February 1, 1991.
They were sent to Beneficial in Delaware, and he picked up his refund on
February 3, 1991, at H & R Block's office in South Carolina.69
Like every closed-end loan, Cades's loan differed from the usual
§ 37-3-201); 1982 S.D. Laws 341, § 1 (eradicating South Dakota's open-ended usury limitation
in 1982 with the enactment of S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-1.1 (Lexis Supp. 1999); see also MD.
CODE ANN., CoM. LAW II § 12-306 (1990). Maryland changed its usury laws in 1980 from a flat
18% APR, to varying interest rates ranging from 2.75% per month for that part of the loan less
than $500, to 1.35% per month for loans exceeding $5000. Id. § 12-30(a)(2)(i) & (a)(5). Then
in 1982, Maryland enacted a temporary lifting of the usury rates for loans made from 1982
through 1985. The new rates were 2.75% per month for that part not exceeding $1000 on a loan
of less than $2000 to 2% per month for any loan over $2000. Id. § 12-306(a)(6).
66. 517 U.S. 735,739-40 (1996) (finding credit card late charges within the National
Bank Act's definition of interest).
67. See id.; see also Nelson v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 794 F. Supp. 312,320
(D. Minn. 1992) (dismissing a law suit by Minnesota credit card customers against a South
Dakota bank that charged late fees and over-limit fees in addition to interest in violation of
Minnesota law because section 85 of the National Bank Act completely preempts state law for
anationally charteredbank); Sherman v. Citibank (SouthDakota), N.A., 679 A.2d 652,652 (N.J.
1996) (reinstating a ruling of the New Jersey Appellate Division that allowed importing of late
fees).
68. 43 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1994).
69. Id. at 872.
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open-end (credit card) loan in several ways. First, the debtor had no pre-
existing line of credit or other association with the lender; the South
Carolina intermediary introduced them. Second, because H & R Block
prepared the loan documentation and disbursed the proceeds of the loan in
South Carolina, the transaction had an explicit and clear relation to the
debtor's state. Because it was a one-shot transaction, it did not present the
problem that a credit card does because the card issuer cannot be expected to
apply different rates to different transactions by the same debtor if the debtor
buys in different states, moves from one state to another, or when some
distant state changes its law. Here, H & R Block easily could have told
Beneficial of the permissible South Carolina rate.70
Cades argued that Beneficial, by contracting with H & R Block,
was operating an illegal branch in South Carolina.7 Noting that Beneficial
had neither employees nor property in South Carolina, the court rejected that
argument.72 Presumably, a claim that the loan was actually made by H & R
Block also would have been unavailing, for the proceeds were provided by
Beneficial, and the risk was taken by them. If Beneficial had recourse
against H & R Block and if H & R Block's fee (a finder's fee paid by
Beneficial) varied with the size and apparent length of the loan, one might
reach a different conclusion about who the real creditor was.
70. Id. at 873-74.
71. Id. at 874.
72. Id. The Court did not cite any case for this proposition, but was likely relying
upon Independent Bankers Ass'n ofAmerica v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976), which it
did cite earlier in its opinion. See Cades, 43 F.3d at 874. Independent Bankers Ass'n, in turn,
derives its authority from First National Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969). See
IndependentBankersAss'n, 534 F.2d at 925, n.7. In Independent Bankers Ass 'n the D.C. Circuit
held that a customer-bank communication terminal (CBCT, a term that encompasses the modern-
day ATM machine) constitutes a bank branch. See id. at 951. In its analysis, the court noted that
a CBCT could be distinguished from banking-by-mail and banking-by-phone
assistance-services that clearly do not result in the establishment of a branch-because in the
latter two, "no place or facility [is] established (i.e., owned or rented) by [the] bank." Id. at 941;
see also Dickinson, 396 U.S. at 137-38 (concluding that an armored car service (operated by
bank employees) and a shopping center banking receptacle (fixed facility owned by bank)
constituted branches); Brown v. Clarke, 878 F.2d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
messenger service operated by bank employees is a bank branch); Bank of the N. Shore v. FDIC,
743 F.2d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that a CBCT owned and maintained by a bank is
treated as abranch); Missouri ex. rel. Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 219,220 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding that use of a CBCT is branch banking). Ownership of a facility or operation by
bank employees, however, are neither necessary nor sufficient criteria for determining whether
a particular service or facility constitutes a bank. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479
U.S. 388,409 (1987) (concluding that a discountbrokerage house owned by a bank and operated
by its employees was not a branch because it did not offer "core banking functions"); Red Bird
Bank v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 667 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. App. 1984) (concluding that loan-
production office owned by a bank and operated by its employees was not a branch because its
activities were not the equivalent of lending money); Michigan Nat'l Corp., 64 FED. REs. BULL.
127, 131-32 (1978) (concluding that an agreement among a number of subsidiary banks to
provide each other's customers with certain banking services resulted in each bank being a
branch of each other, despite the fact that no one bank had in fact established or operated any
other bank or facility or made its employees available to provide services at the subsidiary bank
locations).
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The Fourth Circuit refused to distinguish Marquette:
Essentially, [Cades] asserts that in Marquette,
cards were issued, credit was advanced, and
finance charges were assessed in the national
bank's home state. He argues that in this case, by
contrast, the loan transaction occurred in South
Carolina: he signed all the relevant documents
there; he had face-to-face dealings with Block
representatives relating to his loan there; and
finance charges were assessed there.
These asserted distinctions are not convincing. It is
undisputed that the loan was approved in
Beneficial's Delaware office, not in South
Carolina. The loan proceeds originated in
Delaware and were later transmitted to South
Carolina. Both Marquette and this case involve
face-to-face solicitation of out of state consumers
by agents of a national bank. In both instances, the
interest rate a national bank may charge is
governed by section 85, which looks to the interest
rates allowed by the state where the bank is
located-not where the borrower is located or
where the loan transaction may be said to have
occurred.73
Basile v. H & R Block, Inc.74 goes one step beyond Cades. In Basile
the customer came to an H & R Block store in Pennsylvania, but the loan
was arranged with the Delaware subsidiary of Mellon, whose headquarters
and principal bank subsidiary were themselves in Pennsylvania.75 The only
plausible reason for making the loan with the Delaware subsidiary and not
with the Pennsylvania subsidiary (that might have been next door to H & R
Block) was to avoid the Pennsylvania usury law. The court correctly stated
the traditional fiction that a subsidiary is legally distinct from its parent and
siblings: "Mellon is located in Delaware. 76 This approval of the parties'
conscious choice of an out-of-state subsidiary, whose profits return to
exactly the same place in Pittsburgh as the profits of the in-state subsidiaries,
stretches the economic fiction a bit beyond Cades.
In a case decided the year before Basile, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas applied the Marquette rule to a garden variety closed-end loan, a
loan for the purchase of a car. In Wiseman v. State Bank & Trust, the
Arkansas court found that a Tulsa national bank can legally make a closed-
end loan to two residents of Arkansas who bought a car in Arkansas and
73. Cades, 43 F.3d at 873-74.
74. 897 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
75. See MELLONBANK, 1998 ANmuAL REPORT (1999).
76. Basile, 897 F. Supp. at 199.
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were "referred" to the Tulsa bank.77 State Bank happened to be a subsidiary
of an Arkansas bank holding company named Arvest Bank Group, Inc. who,
like Mellon, did business in its home state through other subsidiaries." In
this case the parties conceded that the loan would have violated the
Arkansas usury law had it been made there.79 Both the loan application and
the loan documents were filled out at the car dealership in Arkansas. The
application was faxed to Tulsa, and the loan approval was phoned back to
Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The Wisemans first came to the dealership on June 29;
they drove their car home after their second visit on July 1.80
The Wiseman case differs from Basile in two ways. First, the Tulsa
lender in Wiseman was making a true secured loan and would have a
balance outstanding in reliance on a car in Arkansas for several years. The
extended presence of the collateral in Arkansas is one additional contact
with that state. Second, the Wiseman loan is a meat and potatoes consumer
loan; unlike the unconventional assignment of money due from the federal
government in the H & R Block cases, this was a conventional consumer
loan of the kind made by thousands of consumers each week. After
Wiseman, it is hard to imagine a routine middle-class consumer loan that
could not be made by a bank under the umbrella of Marquette and its federal
law offspring.
After Smiley, Cades, Basile, and Wiseman, little control is left for
the states. I suspect that only loans to the poorest borrowers are still subject
to state limits, but I could be wrong even about those. The following section
deals with those types of loans.
VI. PAWN, RENT-TO-OWN, AND MARQUETTE
The consumer credit market is not homogeneous. The layers extend
from the wealthy, who can borrow large amounts by a phone call, to the
poorest borrowers, who pawn their shotguns and "rent" their furniture. In
the middle are credit card holders of all types, together with the Wisemans
of the world, who take out closed-end purchase money loans. I have found
no case in which out-of-state lenders have used the Marquette doctrine to
import rates for the bottom-layer transactions. This dearth of case law is
probably due partly to economic constraints and partly to legal prohibitions.
The lenders to the lowest stratum of the consumer credit market are
mostly local, although consolidation is on the horizon for some industries
and advancing rapidly for others. For example, the pawnshop industry
remains highly fragmented. The five publicly traded national pawnshop
companies operate fewer than six percent of the total pawnshops in the
77. 854 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ark. 1993).
78. Arvest Bank Group, Inc. does business in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Missouri;
it has twelve bank subsidiaries in Arkansas. See Arvest, Bank & Branch Guide (visited Apr. 2,
2000) <http://www.arvest.com/branches>.
79. Wiseman, 854 S.W.2d at 726 n.1.
80. Id. at 725-26.
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United States,"' estimated at twelve thousand to fourteen thousand
nationwide.8 2 Management in the industry believes that the pawnshop
industry is in the initial stages of consolidation. 3 In contrast, many of the
approximately six thousand check-cashing outlets nationwide also remain
classic mom-and-pop businesses, but the industry is rapidly consolidating."
One-third of the outlets are operated by six companies, led by the largest,
Ace Cash Express." The rent-to-own industry is experiencing similar
consolidation.86 According to the Association of Progressive Rental
Organizations, a rent-to-own trade association, there are approximately eight
thousand rent-to-own stores in the United States. 7 The largest rent-to-own
chain, Rent-A-Center, and its subsidiary, ColorTyme, operate over 2300, or
29%, of those 8000 stores. 8 Rent-Way, Inc., the second largest rent-to-own
company, is not far behind, with 1086 stores.89
The use of an unrelated out-of-state bank is unappealing to these
low-end lenders for one economic and one legal reason. The parties in the
cases that use unrelated out-of-state banks are sellers of goods or services,
such as H & R Block or a Pine Bluff car dealer. Presumably, these parties
make most of their money by the sale of tax services or of automobiles-not
by making loans to their customers. Pawnbrokers and payday lenders, on the
other hand, are lenders and lenders only; what they sell would be completely
appropriated by an out-of-state lender. To mate with an out-of-state
unaffiliated bank is to forfeit their entire gain; thus, such a marriage is not
economically appealing. Moreover, the fragmentation of this market has
meant that most lenders to low income consumers do not have out-of-state
affiliated banks or lack the resources or sophistication to establish out-of-
state affiliated banks. Of course, the consolidation of the rent-to-own, pawn,
and payday market may change that.
Pawnbrokers or payday lenders that might find importation of rates
from an out-of-state affiliate economically sensible and possible (because
they have such an affiliate) might still be concerned with certain legal issues.
81. STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATE DEsCRIPTIONs, FIRsT CASH FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC. (2000).
82. Lucy Harr, The "Loan Shark"is Alive and Well, CREDITUNIONMAG., Jan. 1998,
at 19A (citing estimates from the National Pawnbroker's Association).
83. STANDARD AND POOR'S, supra note 81. One of the banners on the web site of
EZCORP, for example, one of the five publicly traded companies, reads "Sell Us Your Store."
See EZCORP, Welcome to EZCORP! (last visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.ezcorp.com>.
84. Shelly Branch, Where Cash is King, FORTUNE, June 8, 1998, at 201,202.
85. Id.
86. Shelly Branch, Wayne's New World: Another Trashy Business, FORTUNE, Feb.
2, 1998, at 29.
87. See APRO, What is Rent-to-Own? (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.apro-
tro.com/content/whatisrto.asp>.
89. See Rent- a - Center, Corporate Profile (visited Mar. 16,
2000)<httpllwww. rentacenter.conrlcorporate.html>.
90. See Rent -Way, Company Information (visited Mar. 16, 2000)
<http://www. rentway.com>.
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Consider a typical pawnshop loan. These are nonrecourse" loans against
specific items of personal property: jewelry, guns, musical instruments, etc.
Because these loans are nonrecourse, the lender must have a sharp eye for
the value of the items pawned. His entire recovery depends on his ability to
sell the item for more than the loan if the debtor does not reclaim it. So the
skill required to be a successful pawnshop operator is considerable, and it is
not clear how that skill could be exercised from a distant place. It is also not
clear whether the anxious borrower would be willing to wait for the funds to
come from another state. Yet if the decision to make the loan is done in the
debtor's state, the fiction of an "out-of-state lender" may have been
exceeded. Surely a pawnshop in Texarkana, Arkansas, could position a bank
subsidiary across the border in Texas and go through the ritual of having a
cashier's check delivered in paper or electronically from Texas, but the
critical decisions would have been made in Arkansas; the collateral would
be held and, if not redeemed, sold there. Even the most generous cases on
importation, Cades and Wiseman, note that the decision to issue the loan
was made outside of the debtor's state.9' In each of these cases, that fact was
decisive in the courts' decisions to permit the lender to charge the higher,
out-of-state interest rate.92
Rent-to-own practices face similar legal and economic barriers. The
classic rent-to-own contract provides that title to the rented item passes to
the renter only if he makes all the payments; the renter can return the item
without liability at the end of any payment period. Some states treat these
transactions as leases because of the lessee's right to cancel. 93 For the states
that treat these transactions as loans, the imputed interest rate would be well
above most usury limits.9' The Minnesota courts have found that rent-to-
own contracts are subject to Minnesota usury laws,9' and courts in
Wisconsin 6 and New Jersey' are considering similar claims. If the
Minnesota rule prevails in other states, it will become important to know
whether foreign rates can be imported for these transactions too.
The seller or lessor's decision to enter into a rent-to-own transaction
can probably be made from a remote location as easily as a conventional
90. See Jarret C. Oelgen, Florida Pawnbroking: An Industry in Transition, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 995, 997 (1996) (highlighting the history of pawnbroking in Florida and
explaining regulation of that industry).
91. See Cades v. H & R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1994); Wiseman v.
State Bank & Trust, N.A., 854 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ark. 1993).
92. Cades, 43 F.3d at 874, Wiseman, 854 S.W.2d at 728.
93. See Mr. C's Rent to Own v. Jarrells (In re Jarrells), 205 B.R. 994, 999 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1997).
94. See Eligio Pimentel, Renting-to-Own: Exploitation or Market Efficiency?, 13
LAW & INEQ. J. 369, 374-75 (1995).
95. See Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. 1994).
96. See Burney v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 763 (E.D.Wis. 1996);
LeBakken Rent-to-Own v. Warnell, 589 N.W.2d 425,430 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
97. See Green v. Continental Rentals, 678 A.2d 759, 765-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1994) (subjecting rent-to-own transactions to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act's usury
restrictions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to :8-2.13 (West 1989)). But see Ortiz v. Rental
Management, Inc., 65 F.3d 335,341-42 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying federal law to determine that
rental purchase agreements are not sales for the purposes of the Truth in Lending Act).
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loan decision can be. The difficulty for a remote rent-to-own seller comes
with the need to take returns and make substitutions for goods that prove
defective. Because more than half of the people that rent new goods do not
complete the series of payments, more than half of the goods rented must
come back. 8 That means someone must pick up these returned items and
offer them for a second sale or lease. Also, someone must fulfill the promise
of replacement for goods that do not work properly (free replacement of
nonworking goods is an important part of the rent-to-own bargain)." Will
the courts treat an out-of-state bank as absent from a state in which it (or an
affiliate on its behalf) repossesses, replaces, and re-rents its collateral? The
cases give no answer.
Presence in the debtor's state might be legally significant for two
reasons. First, the out-of-state bank might be considered to have an illegal
branch in the debtor's state. Such a consideration could have all kinds of
unhappy consequences for the bank, quite apart from the usury issue. A
branch must be approved by the appropriate state or federal authorities and
must be permitted under the applicable law."° The penalties for failing to get
a necessary license and for running an otherwise impermissible branch could
be severe.'
Second, the presence of the bank in the debtor's state could bar the
use of an out-of-state usury law if the court found that the in-state "affiliate"
made the loan. A court that first found an in-state affiliate to be illegal might
not be as quick as the federal court in Pennsylvania was to recognize that the
loan was actually made in Delaware. A court sufficiently offended by the
improper branch might even conclude that the employee in Delaware was
acting as the agent of the illegal South Carolina or Pennsylvania branch. If
the loan were made in South Carolina, it would have to comply with South
Carolina law.
Other credit sellers deal with a slightly more affluent clientele than
the usual rent-to-own customer. These credit sellers sell to a working-class
clientele on credit at rates that exceed the permissible rates in many states.102
These sellers may be more like the pawnbroker than H & R Block in the
sense that their lending activities are more profitable than their cash sales. °3
98. See Barkley Clark et al., "Rent-to-Own" Agreements in Bankruptcy: Sales or
Leases?, 2 AM. BANK. INST. L. REv. 115, 119 (1994) (citing a 1993 APRO Industry Report).
99. See Michael L. Walden, The Economics of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 24 J. OF
CONSUMER AFF. 326, 327, 328, 335 (1990).
100. See 12U.S.C. § 36(c) (1994).
101. See 12U.S.C. § 93(1994).
102. Fingerhut, a direct seller in Minnesota, is an example. The average household
income of Fingerhut's customers is $27,700. Joseph B. Cahill, Where It's Due: Credit Card
Companies Find Tough Rival at Bottom of Consumer Market-Fingerhut's Experience Shows
"SubPrime'Lending Takes Gimmicks, a Lot of Grit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1998, at Al.
103. Because of the use of the "time-price doctrine," it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish profits from "selling" and profits from "lending." See generally NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATIONS AND LEGAL CHALLENGES § 10.3.2.1
(1995 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the time-price exception to the usury laws, as well as its
demise). To evade the usury laws, some sellers traditionally used a "cash price" and a higher
"time price." The courts treated the difference between those two prices as a part of the price,
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Assume a direct seller, like Fingerhut in Minnesota, runs afoul of the local
usury laws.' Can, this direct seller establish a national bank in South
Dakota or Delaware, issue credit cards to its customers from that bank,"'
and so capture the gains from the loans? In none of the cases interpreting
Marquette has the in-state retailer been affiliated with the out-of-state
lender. The Cades court evidently thought that this point might be important,
for the court took pains to note that H & R Block was not affiliated with
Beneficial National." 6
Arguably, the example of Sears and its multistate use of the
Discover card shows that Marquette permits a retailer to enjoy both the
benefits of an out-of-state rate and of being the lender by having an out-of-
state affiliated card issuer.'0 7 Apparently, Fingerhut has also set up an out-of-
state affiliate to issue cards to solve its usury problems in Minnesota-so far
without challenge.'
Return now to the question of whether the local operation is to be
regarded as a branch of the out-of-state affiliate and so both illegal and
guilty of usury. Cades rejects that possibility with a reference to the leading
case, Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith,"9 and a dismissive note that
Beneficial had neither property nor employees in South Carolina. The issue
is not even considered in Wiseman or Basile.
As I have suggested above, the case is more precarious for a payday
lender, a rent-to-own operation, or a pawnshop. Because they are only in the
business of lending money, neither a payday lender nor a pawnshop can
afford to give its business to an unaffiliated out-of-state bank. Yet if one of
these businesses causes its in-state customers to borrow from an out-of-state
affiliate, what is the business other than an agent for that affiliate? By
hypothesis the in-state operation would only be soliciting business for that
not as interest. In fact it was the economic equivalent of an additional interest charge. By
inflating their cash prices, sellers of goods to low income buyers probably use a variation of the
time-price doctrine even today.
104. See Walker v. Fingerhut Corp., No. C5-99-881, 2000 WL 136096, at *6 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2000) (affirming summary judgment for Fingerhut on the Minnesota usury issue).
105. Fingerhut's credit card, the Axsys Credit Advantage offered through the Axsys
National Bank in South Dakota, carries a 25.15% annual percentage rate. See Axsys Credit
Advantage, Terms and Conditions (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http:llwww.axsysbank.com/cgi-
bint>.
106. See Cades v. H & R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 873-74 (4th Cir. 1994).
107. The Discover Card was created in 1986 by Sears's former subsidiary, Dean
Witter Financial Services Group, and maintained a comparatively high interest rate of 19.8%.
See David Griesling & Leah Nathans Spiro, Dean Witter's Excellent Adventure, 3290 Bus. WK.,
Oct. 26, 1992, at 81. Dean Witter was spun off in 1992, and later merged with Morgan Stanley.
See Leah Nathans Spiro, Class Meets Mass on Wall Street, 3514 Bus. WK., Feb. 17,1997, at 78.
Sears now has its own credit card for use in its store only. The Sears Card, with its 21% interest
rate (24% if one fails to make the required minimum monthly payment for two consecutive
billing periods) is issued by the Sears National Bank, located in Arizona. See Sears, Important
Sears Credit Card Terms (visited Apr. 13, 2000) <http://www.sears.com/jsp-
scripts/sears/creditsecreditapp.jsp>.
108. Fingerhut's credit card, the Axsys Credit Advantage is offered through a
subsidiary, Axsys National Bank in South Dakota. See supra note 105.
109. See Cades, 43 F.3d at 874 (citing Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v.
Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
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affiliate. Does that mean its in-state place of business is in substance owned
by the out-of-state affiliate and that its employees are in substance the
employees of the out-of-state lender? If a court were to find that the out-of-
state bank was the owner and local persons were its employees, this case
would be easy. Under Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, the
out-of-state bank would be operating an illegal branch."'
Even if the court refused to pierce the corporate veil, it might still
conclude that the in-state activities were branches if it followed the Federal
Reserve ruling that finds a cooperative agreement among a number of
subsidiary banks to handle the affairs of one another's customers sufficient
to make each a branch of the other."' Because the entire purpose of the in-
state office would be to find and serve the out-of-state affiliate's customers,
this case would be easier than the one considered by Federal Reserve
Bulletin.
If the in-state location had some purpose other than making loans
(such as selling unredeemed goods along with other goods) and particularly
if it had arrangements with several out-of-state banks, the local outlet might
escape the branch label under Independent Bankers Ass' v. Marine
Midland Bank."2 That case held that an independently owned ATM shared
by several banks was not a branch of any of the banks. 3
It will be difficult for pawnbrokers and rent-to-own lenders to make
their loans through out-of-state affiliates without running afoul of the
branching (and thus of the local usury) laws. Payday lenders might find a
way to conduct transactions over the Internet and escape local usury laws
entirely (at least if they make the loan through a bank); however, whether
such lenders need a face-to-face meeting to properly evaluate their risk and
to induce payment remains to be seen.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the states are left with only a
shred of the consumer credit market under their control. Should out-of-state
banks and other merchant lenders choose to engage in all modes of
consumer lending, it is not clear that any could be foreclosed by state laws.
The states have a fair argument only at the lowest end-pawnshops and
rent-to-own operations-where a local presence and the prompt availability
of the loan proceeds seem important to make the transactions work in
practice. Even there, only dicta in the decided cases hint at the applicability
of local usury rules.
Of course, the states might try to control lenders' rates by indirect
means, but Marquette and federal statutory law block this way as well. It
would violate section 85 and doubtless other parts of the federal law for a
state to require some kind of a license for a national bank to make loans to
its citizens."' The state can set maximum rates for all banks located in the
110. 534 F.2d 921,951 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
111. OrderApproving Acquisition ofBank, 64 FED. REs. BULL. 127, 131-32 (1978).
112. 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 463.
114. See Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 411-12
(1873); 12 C.F.R. § 560.110 (1999); see also Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. Sween Corp.,
916 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Minn. 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, 118 F.3d 1255, 1262 (8th
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state, but that is politically and morally unacceptable, for it would punish
Abel and benefit Cain.
The states could try to get section 85 and the attendant federal
legislation repealed, but they would face insurmountable opposition.
National banks and federal bank regulators"' would surely oppose repeal.
This opposition would be expressed by representatives of states where
national bank issuers of credit cards are headquartered (including at the least
New York (Chase and Citigroup)," 6 North Carolina (Bank of America,
Wachovia and First Union)," 7 Illinois and Ohio (Bank One)". and
California (Bank of America and Wells Fargo))." 9 Of course, Delaware2
and perhaps a few other courtesans that profit indirectly from the current
regime would squeal.
Under my reading of Marquette, the states cannot even segment
their markets. Under the most-favored lender doctrine, a state or national
bank located in a particular state may carry the rate from one form of loan in
that state (say rates for industrial loan companies) to other forms in that state
(say agricultural loans), but only if the industrial loan company could make
an agricultural loan.' Or a bank can make loans at small-loan rates in its
home state without having a license, but only to the loan-amount ceilings
that would apply to a small-loan lender.'" However, when a bank
incorporates a rate from out-of-state under Marquette, it need not concern
itself with the local rules on agricultural loans, small loans, first mortgage
loans or the like. It incorporates those rules from within its home state. Thus
if the bank comes from a state like Delaware whose laws permit consumer
Cir. 1997) (exempting national bank from state requirement for a broker's license).
115. It is commonly claimed that agencies which regulate industries are "captured"
by the members of the industry. Although the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller are
comparatively independent, they too can be expected to champion the interests of the industries
they regulate when those industries are under attack. See Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians, Interest
Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple Principals Agency Theory ofRegulation, or "Let Them Be
Bribed," 33 J.L. & ECON. 65 (1990).
116. See CHASE MANRATrAN, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 32 (1999); CITIOROUP, 1998
ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1999).
117. See FIRSTUNiON, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999).
118. See BANK ONE, 1998 ANNUALREPORT 16 (1999).
119. See WELLS FARGO & CO., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1999).
120. Delaware has modified its laws to make them particularly inviting to out-of-state
banks. Presumably, the same interest that caused them to attract banks would cause them to
defend the bank's position. See Richard P. Eckman, The Delaware Consumer Credit Bank Act
and "Exporting " Interest under Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary ControlAct of 1980,39 Bus. LAW. 1264, 1266-67 (1984).
121. See Walsh v. First State Bank, 409 N.W.2d 5, 6-7 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
122. Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 556 F. Supp. 1100, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The
'most favored lender' provision of the National Bank Act, later codified as 12 U.S.C. § 85
(1994), permits national banks to charge the maximum interest rate on loans or other evidences
of debt allowed to competing lending institutions by the laws of the state in which the national
bank is located. If the state permits a higher interest rate for a particular type of loan, a national
bank may charge the higher rate for such loans. For example, a national bank may charge the rate
of interest charged by small loan companies, even though it could not be licensed as a small loan
company, provided that the bank makes similar types of loans.
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loans without rate or other restrictions,"r3 the out-of-state bank can ignore
not only the local rates, but also the local market segmentation." In
Wiseman we see State Bank in Tulsa making a 13% loan in Arkansas even
though not one Arkansas lender could have made that loan legally.'"
So here we are. For reasons that cannot be explained in less than
fifty minutes or understood without a law degree, the usury law for all fifty
states is increasingly being replaced by laws enacted in Dover, Delaware
and Pierre, South Dakota. As the banking and nonbank lending industries
consolidate and as the usury rates in restrictive states like Arkansas, 2 '
Minnesota, 27 and Vermonts begin to pinch those national players, that
trend will accelerate.
VII. A WISE RESULT?
For the purpose of this section, assume that my analysis is
correct-namely, that all but a small part of consumer credit in every state
will eventually be subject to unlimited rates that are imported from states
with unlimited rates. Consider two alternatives to this regime. First,
Congress could set rates for all loans and prohibit the states from setting
others; clearly it has the Constitutional authority to set such rates and to
override contrary state law.'" Second, we could return to the system that
prevailed before Marquette in which almost all of the consumer loans to the
citizens of a state were subject to the usury laws of that state. Other
variations would also be possible. For example, certain loans, such as credit
card loans, might be subject to a uniform federal rule and others, such as
pawns, would be subject to state rules.
If you are convinced, as I am, by the economic literature that treats
the usury laws as crude and misguided devices, 3 ' if you believe that these
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2301 (1999).
124. See Cades v. H & R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1994); Copeland v.
M3NA America Bank, N.A., 907 P.2d 87, 91 (Colo. 1995) (en bane).
125. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
126. See ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. XIX, § 13 (1873) (limiting interest rates to 5%
above the Federal Reserve discount rate, and for consumer loans, setting a maximum of 17%).
127. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01(1) (West 1995) (limiting interest rates to 8%
unless specifically exempted).
128. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a(a) (1993) (limiting interest to 12% unless
specifically exempted).
129. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that laws
enacted by Congress preempt state law to the extent that Congress does not overstep its powers.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In addition, the Interstate Commerce Clause gives Congress the power
to regulate commerce among the several states. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "[It] was within the
constitutional power of Congress to fix the rate of interest which a national bank may take upon
a loan ofmoney...." Central Nat'l Bank v. Pratt, 115 Mass. 539, 546 (1874); see also Tikkanen
v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 801 F. Supp. 270,280 (D. Minn. 1992) (concluding that section
85 is not "an impermissible delegation of Congress's authority") (footnote omitted).
130. See, e.g., Steven M. Crafton, An Empirical Test of the Effect of Usury Laws, 23
J.L. & ECON. 135, 145 (1980); James E. McNulty, A Reexamination of the Problem of State
Usury Ceilings: The Impact in the Mortgage Market, 20 Q.REv.ECON.& Bus. 16,26-27 (1980);
Loretta J. Mester, Why Are Credit Card Rates Sticky?, 4 ECON. THEORY 505, 505, 521 (1994);
Usury Laws: The Bad Side of Town, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 28, 1998, at 30. But see David Levy,
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laws diminish the standard of living of those subject to them,'3 ' if you think
that at best they create enclaves of monopoly or oligopoly,' and if you
agree that the unavoidable attempts to evade them cause gross inefficiency
in the form of expensive subterfuges, 33 then emphatically we should not
return to the nineteenth century. Contrary to those who claim to befriend the
impecunious consumer and who rail against usury laws, I think even the
poorest consumers are quite savvy. They understand the alternatives and
make choices about borrowing that are wise for them even when the
decisions seem foolish or wasteful to middle-class observers. I say let the
bankruptcy laws, the restrictions on garnishment and collection, the
exemption laws, and the debtors' considerable guile protect them from their
creditors. We should not decree abstinence.
To reject usury laws is not to endorse the current state of the law.
There must be considerable inefficiencies in making Citibank pretend that it
is lending from South Dakota by setting up a subsidiary there 3 4 or in
requiring H & R Block to arrange a loan from a Delaware bank to a South
Carolina debtor. 3 To measure those inefficiencies is beyond me, but they
must be considerable. It would be better if we could avoid them.
Should we then have a federal usury law? For critics of usury laws,
there are risks in a federal law too. Under the current regime neither South
Dakota nor Delaware dares lower its rates for fear of losing Citibank and its
friends as clients. Congress probably lacks the will to overthrow the status
quo but, if it did so, it would not thereafter be inhibited by any such fear. In
a year in which the populists captured the Congress and the White House,
imposing a national usury limit-even one demonstrably below the market
rate-might be appealing to those in power. Creditors could not avoid that
law by moving from one state to another. It would likely produce
subterfuges that would make those practiced heretofore look like fools' play.
Given the choices, the current regime may be the best we can do. It
is now difficult and will become increasingly more so for any state to
impose stem usury limits on any but a small part of the consumer loan
transactions in that state. The inefficiencies in the current system may be a
fair price for keeping Senator Kennedy and his successors from doing well-
intentioned harm to consumer debtors.
Adam Smith's Casefor UsuryLaws, in 2 ADAM SMITH 181,196 (Mark Blaug, ed., 1991) (stating
that "where law can improve social well-being [Adam] Smith favors it"); Eric A. Posner,
Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws,
and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995) (defending
usury laws).
131. See Usury Laws: The Bad Side of Town, supra note 130, at 31.
132. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private
Ordering: An Institutional and EmpiricalAnalysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHi. L. REV. 41,
46-48 (2000) (discussing the monopolistic effects of organized crime in Japan).
133. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1988); W. J. Boyes
& Dale Beck Furnish, A Note on the Use ofIncorporation as an Escape from Usury Ceilings, 32
J. INDUS. ECON. 365 (1984).
134. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
A COMPARISON OF INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS ON
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN MINNESOTA AND SOUTH
CAROLINA
A. Open-End Financial Institution (Credit Card)
Under Minnesota law, the interest for an open-end credit card loan
is limited to 18%.' This rate is determined by reviewing the different
Minnesota code sections that govern lenders. First, a lender can pay an
initial fee of $500 and, as long as it has at least $50,000 in liquid assets,
qualify as a "financial institution."2 Second, financial institutions have
explicit exceptions from the general usury limit of 8% contained in section
334.01. 3 Section 47.59 states the following: "With respect to open-end
credit pursuant to a credit card, [a] financial institution may contract for and
receive a finance charge on the unpaid balance of the principal amount at an
annual percentage rate not exceeding 18 percent per year."4 Notably, this
section provides an explicit exception from the usury rates for a financial
institution that lends pursuant to open- and closed-end loans that do not
involve credit cards.5
The interest rate for a supervised lender in South Carolina is
unlimited if the principal is greater than $600, but is otherwise limited.6
Under South Carolina law, supervised lenders are permitted to have higher
interest rates than unsupervised lenders To become a "supervised lender,"
the lender must apply for a license with the State Board of Financial
Institutions and must prove assets in excess of $25,000.8 For a supervised
lender, section 37-3-201 sets out the interest rate restrictions as follows:
(2) With respect to a consumer loan,
including a loan pursuant to open-end
credit ....
(a) on loans with a cash advance not
exceeding six hundred dollars, a
maximum charge not exceeding the
maximum charges imposed in Section 34-
29-140 as disclosed as an annual
percentage rate ....
(b) on loans with a cash advance
exceeding six hundred dollars, and on all
loans, regardless of the dollar amount,
1. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.59(3)(a) (West Supp. 2000).
2. Id. § 56.02.
3. Id. § 47.59(2).
4. Id. § 47.59(3)(a).
5. See infra Appendix Part B.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-201 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & West Supp. 1999).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 37-3-503(1)-(2) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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made by Supervised Financial
Organizations, any rate filed and posted
pursuant to Section 37-3-305; or
(c) on loans of any amount, eighteen
percent per year on the unpaid balances of
principal.9
Thus, the lender of $1000 has an unlimited interest rate as long as the
disclosure requirements of section 37-3-305 are complied with. For a lender
of less than $600, including the $300 loan represented in the chart, the code
points to section 34-29-140. That section reads in part:
(a) A licensee under this chapter may lend
any sum of money not exceeding seventy-
five hundred dollars, excluding charges,
and notwithstanding the fact that the loan
may be repayable in substantially equal
monthly installments, may contract for
and receive finance charges not to exceed:
(2) On loans with a cash advance
exceeding one hundred fifty dollars but
not exceeding two thousand dollars,
twenty-five dollars per one hundred
dollars on that portion of the cash advance
not exceeding six hundred dollars ....
In addition to the finance charges
authorized in subparagraphs (1) and (2) of
this subsection (a), a licensee under this
chapter may contract for and receive an
initial charge in such an amount as may be
agreed upon in writing with the borrower,
but not to exceed seven percent of the
cash advance or fifty-six dollars,
whichever is the lesser .... 10
Thus the finance charge on the $300 loan is limited to $25 per $100 loaned,
plus an initial fee of 7%. Combined, these costs give the borrower an
effective rate of 54.6% APR.
B. Closed-End Financial Institution
In Minnesota a lender of $300 is limited to a 33% interest rate,
9. Id. § 37-3-201(2) (West Supp. 1999).
10. Id. § 34-29-140 (West Supp. 1999).
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while the lender of $1000 is limited to a 29.5% rate."' Minnesota law carries
variable interest rates for financial institutions that lend pursuant to a closed-
end loan. Thus, for a lender that has complied with the "regulated lender"
requirements discussed in Part A of this Appendix, the interest rates are set
out in section 47.59 as follows:
(a)With respect to a loan,
including a loan pursuant to open-end
credit but excluding open-end credit
pursuant to a credit card, a financial
institution may contract for and receive a
finance charge on the unpaid balance of
the principal amount not to exceed the
greater of:
(1) an annual percentage rate not
exceeding 21.75 percent; or
(2) the total of:
(i) 33 percent per year on that
part of the unpaid balance of the principal
amount not exceeding $750; and
(ii) 19 percent per year on that
part of the unpaid balance of the principal
amount exceeding $750.2
Under this statute for financial institutions not lending pursuant to a credit
card agreement, any loan of $3818 or more would carry the rate set out in
subsection (1), while loans below that amount would use subsection (2).
In South Carolina, loans by supervised lenders, whether open- or
closed-end, are governed by the same statute that allows a filing with the
Department of Consumer Affairs to facilitate loans with unlimited interest
rates for loans exceeding $600. For loans below $600, section 37-3-201
establishes that the borrower will have an effective interest rate of 54.6%
APR'1
3
C. Closed-End Merchant Sale
A closed-end credit sale by a Minnesota merchant is subject to the
general usury limit of $8 per year on $100 borrowed. 4 The definition of a
loan in section 47.59 gives financial institutions an exception from this
general limit, but adds the following caveat: "'Loan' does not include the
forbearance of debt arising from a sale or lease, a credit sale contract, or an
overdraft from a person's deposit account with a financial institution which
is not pursuant to a written agreement to pay overdrafts with the right to
11. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 47.59(3)(a) (West Supp. 2000).
12. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-201(2)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & West Supp. 1999); see
also supra Part II.A.
14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01(1) (West 1993).
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defer repayment thereof.""5
In South Carolina a separate chapter of the Consumer Protection
Code deals with credit sales. Section 37-2-201(2)(a) exempts a lender in a
"consumer credit sale" from all interest restrictions if there is a filing with
the Department of Consumer Affairs.1"
15. Id. § 47.59(1)() (West Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). Under that same
definitional subsection, Minnesota defines a "credit sale contract" as follows:
(i) "Credit sale contract" means a contract evidencing
a credit sale. "Credit sale" means a sale of goods or
services, or an interest in land, in which:
(1) credit is granted by a seller
who regularly engages as a
seller in credit transactions of
the same kind; and
(2) the debt is payable in
installments or a finance charge
is made.
Id. § 47.59(l)(i). Another Minnesota section that exempts some transactions from the
general usury limit of $8 on every $100 is section 334.16. That section reads:
(a) The sale is a consumer credit sale pursuant to an
open end credit plan, agreement or arrangement
between the buyer and seller under which (1) the
seller may permit the buyer to make purchases from
time to time from the seller or other sellers, (2) the
buyer has the privilege of paying the balance in full
or in installments, and (3) a finance charge may be
computed by the seller from time to time on an
outstanding unpaid balance; and
(b) The terms of the plan, agreement or arrangement
provide for a periodic rate of finance charge which
does not exceed 1-1/2 percent per month computed
on an amount no greater than the average daily
balance of the account during each monthly billing
cycle; provided a minimum finance charge not in
excess of 50 cents per month may be imposed,
charged or collected.
Id. § 334.16(1) (West 1993) (emphasis added).
16. That section states:
(1) With respect to a consumer credit sale, including
a sale pursuant to a revolving charge account, a seller
may contract for and receive a credit service charge
not exceeding that permitted by this Section.
(2) The credit service charge, calculated according
the actuarial method, may not exceed the greater of
either of the following:
(a) any rate filed and posted pursuant to
§ 37-2-305, or
(b) eighteen (18%) percent per
year on the unpaid balances of
the amount financed.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-201 (Law. Co-op. 1989). Section 37-2-305, referred to in section (2)(a),
merely sets out the filing requirement so that a lender may use any rate it files. See id. § 37-2-
305 (West Supp. 1999).
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D. Payday
In South Carolina payday loans are treated as closed-end loans.
Thus, the interest rate is limited in the same manner as discussed in
Appendix Part B. The same is true for payday loans in Minnesota for
amounts above $350;17 however, Minnesota has a separate statute for small
loans that will be paid back in one installment. To be entitled to the higher
small-loan rate, the loan must be limited to thirty days and $350 or else the
loan is governed by section 47.59. The statutory finance charge limitations
for a $300 small loan of this type are as follows:
(4) for amounts in excess of $250 and not
greater than the maximum in subdivision
1, paragraph (a), a charge may be added
equal to six percent of the loan proceeds
with a minimum of $17.50 plus a $5
administrative fee.'"
Thus for a $300 loan paid on the thirtieth day, the APR is 92%.
E. Pawn
Licensed pawnshops in Minnesota can charge 3% per month, or
36% APR.19 Pawnshops in South Carolina may charge a much higher rate,
which is seen in the following statute:
Pawnbrokers may charge interest on loans
not exceeding the following amounts:
(1) at the rate of two dollars and
fifty cents per thirty-day period for each
ten dollars loaned for the first fifty dollars
loaned;
(2) at the rate of two dollars per
thirty-day period for each ten dollars
loaned on that portion of the loan
exceeding fifty dollars but not exceeding
one hundred dollars;
(3) at the rate of one dollar and
fifty cents per thirty-day period for each
ten dollars loaned on that portion of the
loan exceeding one hundred dollars but
not exceeding two hundred dollars;
(4) at the rate of one dollar per
thirty-day period for each ten dollars
17. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 47.60(l)(a) (West Supp. 2000)
18. Id. § 47.60(2)(a)(4).
19. Id. § 325J.07(a).
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loaned on that portion of the loan
exceeding two hundred dollars but not
exceeding one thousand dollars;
(5) at the rate of fifty cents per
thirty-day period for each ten dollars
loaned on that portion of the loan
exceeding one thousand dollars but not
exceeding two thousand dollars.2"
Thus a lender of $300 will receive 13.5% per month, or 162% APR, and a
lender of $1000 will receive 11.75% per month, or 141% APR.
F. Rent-to-Own
Rent-to-own transactions are treated as closed-end loans in
Minnesota; thus the interest is limited as in Appendix Part B. In South
Carolina the definition of "consumer credit sale" includes rent-to-own
transactions, but with the proper filing with the Department of Consumer
Affairs, there is no usury limitation as discussed in Appendix Part A.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-39-100 (West Supp. 1999).
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